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SNIADACH THROUGH DI-CHEM AND BACKWARDS: AN
ANALYSIS OF VIRGINIA'S ATTACHMENT AND DETINUE
STATUTES
B. J. Brabham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few cases in debtor-creditor relations have been discussed as
much as Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' Fuentes v. Shevin,2
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,' and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.4 Despite the volume already written, however, the
commentary appears destined to continue for some time to come.
Thanks largely to this outpouring of attention, most lawyers and
students are acutely aware of the fundamental issue involved in that
line of cases, namely: is it constitutional to seize a debtor's property
without notice and a hearing? Before Sniadach the answer of most
lawyers and students even remotely conversant with this aspect of
debtor-creditor relations would have been a simple "yes." Sniadach,
however, overturned Wisconsin's provisional remedy statutes,5 the
* B.A., Texas A & M, 1951; M.A., North Texas State University, 1962; J.D., University of
Texas 1956; LL.M., New York Univ. Law School, 1966; Professor of Law, University of
Richmond.
1. 395 U. S. 337 (1969).
2. 407 U. S. 67 (1972).
3. 416 U. S. 600 (1974).
4. 419 U. S. 601 (1975).
5. Provisional remedies is a term frequently used to cover a broad range of pre-judgment
remedies available to creditors. See, S. IESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDrroRs'
REMEDIEs AND DETRs' PROTECTION, 177-203 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as RiESENFELD].
This term, as well as the term summary seizure (which means the same thing, since a debtor's
property is seized without notice or hearing) will be used interchangeably throughout this
article.
There are several terms used to denote the process whereby the creditor seizes or freezes
(this latter meaning that the debtor's property may not actually be seized but is still placed
beyond the debtor's reach; the debtor is barred from its use) the debtor's property. The term
most commonly used to describe the actual seizure of the debtor's property is attachment.
This term is used in Virginia when property in the debtor's possession is seized. It is also used
when the debtor's property is in the possession of a third party (usually a principal debtor)
and is taken from that party or that party is ordered to withhold the property from the debtor
pending the outcome of the creditor's underlying cause of action against the debtor. This
latter process is called garnishment in most jurisdictions. In Virginia the term garnishment
describes the same process after judgment.
Detinue and replevin are used interchangeably throughout this article. In the common law
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kind of statutes that were commonplace in most states but, as it
turned out, unconstitutional. Since most lawyers and students
would have routinely answered "yes" to the issue posed above, the
surprise following the Sniadach decision can be easily imagined. For
example, some four years after Sniadach, Professor William D.
Hawkland wrote that not only were many surprised at the way the
court had decided the case but were surprised that "the action was
brought in the first place."'
The surprise has long since worn off and been replaced by dismay
in many quarters. Prior to the Sniadach line of cases there was
stability and certainty, and even though the existing provisional
remedies were recognized as harsh they were at least of ancient
origin.7 Indeed, Justice Holmes, in one of his less celebrated opin-
ions, 8 observed that "nothing is more common than to allow parties
alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by at-
tachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit."'
He added that this provisional remedy is a "familiar method...
and is open to no objection."' "
there was a clear line separating the two, and the line still exists in a number of states.
Broadly speaking, though, they refer to the action whereby the creditor seizes property in
which he (the creditor) has a pre-existing interest; generally a consensual interest, a U.C.C.
Article 9 security interest in most instances. For a full account of these last four terms, see
Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE
L.J. 52 (1968); Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical
Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. Rav. 155 (1957).
6. Hawkland, The Seeds of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 COMm. L.J. 245 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hawkland].
7. Professor Riesenfeld traces the origin and development of provisional remedies. A means
of reaching a debtor's property without a judgment originated early in the law. The ease with
which creditors could reach a debtor's property and the variety of conditions under which this
could be done evolved in relatively recent times and was something of an American innova-
tion. See RmsENFELD, supra note 5, at 244-53.
8. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928). The case upheld a Georgia statute
which allowed attachment of a debtor's property prior to notice and a hearing.
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id. Before appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court, the provisional remedy in Sniadach was
upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The lower court dissenters in the Sniadach case,
however, were quite critical of Justice Holmes' reasoning in the Coffin Bros. case, calling it
"specious." Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis.2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259, 268 (1967).
It was this dissent that was ultimately proved correct. In point of fact the majority in
Sniadach was openly impressed with the dissenters in the Wisconsin Court. Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, directs the reader to compare the majority and dissenting opinions in the
lower court. 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Objection came from Ms. Christine Sniadach several decades
later, an objection that was to prove successful. Twice since her
case, and the line of cases that was to follow, the Virginia House of
Delegates has revised parts of the state's provisional remedies stat-
utes. The purpose of this article is to examine those legislative ef-
forts" in order to see if they will pass constitutional muster in the
event they are tested by a latter day Sniadach. Implicit is the
thought that the Sniadach line of cases has in fact provided a stan-
dard for judges to evaluate existing statutes and for draftsmen to
see and follow. The dismay that this line of cases has generated has
caused a number of writers to doubt that such standards exist. They
seem to be of the opinion that the Supreme Court was given the
opportunity in the '70's to expand due process protection of property
interests, not unlike the opportunity presented the Warren Court in
the criminal area in the '60's; but, unlike the Warren Court, this
Court, these writers feel, has created a state of flux due to the
inconsistency and obscurity of its opinions from Sniadach through
Di-Chem.12
In spite of the imposing volume of criticism wrought by this flux,
there is general agreement that outlines, 13 dim as they may be, are
beginning to emerge, and they are discernible enough to act as
guidelines for testing the constitutionality of state provisional rem-
edy statutes. To see these outlines more clearly, one must be famil-
iar with the uneven course taken by the Court from Sniadach to Di-
Chem. Sniadach and Fuentes, the first of the line, stunned the
creditor community," but after they were decided, everyone knew
the rules of the game, new though they were. Even if problems were
11. There are many pre-judgment remedies, e.g., mechanics liens, landlord liens, et cetera.
This article will analyze the constitutionality only of Virginia's attachment and detinue
statutes.
12. In addition to those law review writers whose works are cited elsewhere and discussed
at length and who agree that standards are discernable, other commentators are, for the most
part, highly critical of the Court's failure, in their view, to provide sound doctrine for this
line of cases. See, e.g., Newton, Procedural Due Process and Pre-judgment Creditor Reme-
dies: A Proposal for Reform of the Balancing Test, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 65, 68-79 (1977);
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAlv. L. REV. 41, 71-83 (1974); Weisman, Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant -Prehearing Seizure - To Be or Not to Be, 30 Mo. B.J. 474; Note, Sniadach, Fuentes,
and Mitchell: A Confusing Trilogy and Utah Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 UTAH L. Rav. 536,
542-47.
13. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 101 through 136 infra.
14. See, e.g., Hawkland, supra note 6.
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left unresolved following them, Sniadach and Fuentes were logically
consistent; property rights under the fourteenth amendment were
established with nearly the same clarity that prevailed before. This
clarity, however, was quickly replaced by an opaqueness through
which constitutional guidelines were at first hardly discernible. It
was Mitchell that clouded the relatively clear vista opened by
Sniadach and Fuentes. But Mitchell proved to be a step, not at first
recognized, in a new-and some would say wrong-direction. New
departures by their very nature generally create initial confusion.
Mitchell did this. When the direction Mitchell was moving in be-
came more obvious, the case, in retrospect, became more meaning-
ful. But first there was Sniadach and Fuentes, and Sniadach had
an opaqueness of its own, the first in its line as Mitchell was to be
the first in its.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
A. Sniadach and Fuentes
Sniadach is a familiar enough story-the more so for being a
pathfinder-and may thus be retold with scant attention to details.
Pursuant to Wisconsin statutes," Family Finance garnished the
wages of one of its debtors, Christine Sniadach. Ms. Sniadach at-
tempted to have the garnishment set aside, claiming that the stat-
ute allowed a creditor to freeze her wages before the trial that would
determine the validity of Family Finance's underlying claim. 6 She
claimed she had thus been deprived of her property without due
process of law. To the surprise of practically no one at the time, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the statutes. 7 On certiorari, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court reversed.' 8
Like the Georgia statutes Justice Holmes had referred to, nothing
was more commonplace than the Wisconsin statutes tested in
Sniadach. Thus, following the decision, most states were on notice
that their long standing provisional remedy statutes were constitu-
15. Wis. STAT. §§ 267.04(1), .07(1), .18(2)(a) as cited in 395 U.S. at 338-39.
16. As the Court points out in Sniadach, the creditor could garnish the wages before serving
a summons on the debtor. 395 U.S. at 338. Debtors would typically learn of the suit upon
discovering that their property had already been seized or otherwise frozen.
17. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
18. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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tionally suspect. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, and Jus-
tice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, made it clear, however, that
such statutes would not necessarily be struck down wholesale; some
provisional remedies might be constitutionally available to credi-
tors. Justice Douglas said that property might validly be seized
prior to trial and judgment in "extraordinary situations" and he
cited a number of cases supporting this position." He went on to
observe that there was no state or creditor interest in the Sniadach
case that deserved special protection."0 It was the debtor in this case
that deserved special protection since wages, "a specialized type of
property,"'2' had been garnished.
Since Justice Douglas said that a creditor's as well as a state's
interest might be deserving of special protection, a large question
was left open: what creditor interest(s) should be protected? Of
particular concern was the position of the secured creditor. Was a
security interest the kind of interest deserving special protection?
Was a statute that gave a secured creditor the power to seize prop-
erty constitutional?
Other questions remained unanswered. Two were of particular
importance. First, the majority in Sniadach was of the opinion that,
as was above noted, even general creditors might summarily sieze
or freeze property in extraordinary situations and still not violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Exactly what
these extraordinary situations might be remained unclear. Second,
Justice Douglas stressed the point that wages were a special type of
property. He was concerned about the potential economic disaster
that faced a working person whose wages were garnished. It ap-
peared from the opinion that the debtor's other property, except for
wages, was still subject to summary seizure. But language surround-
ing this portion of the opinion was broad enough to support the view
19. Id. at 339. J. Harlan, concurring, agreed; "special situations," he notes, referring to the
same case Douglas had cited, might justify prehearing seizure. Id. at 343. Some of the cases
cited and the full meaning of the "extraordinary situations" exception to the requirement of
a hearing prior to seizure or freezing of property will be discussed at points elsewhere in the
article. It might be said that the "extraordinary situations" exception has proven to be one
of the most puzzling of the many problems in the Sniadach line of cases. See, e.g., notes 37-
40 infra, and accompanying text.
20, 395 U.S. at 339.
21. Id. at 340.
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that the majority did not intend to limit the new due process protec-
tion to wages. Justice Harlan's concurrence lent support to this
interpretation." Nonetheless, the view persisted, and persists to this
day, that the pre-seizure protection announced in Sniadach should
be limited to wages.23
Fuentes, responding to most of these questions, broke like a
thunder clap over the creditor community. Hopes that wages
might be the only property immune from summary pre-judgment
seizure; that secured creditors had an interest worthy of special
protection; that there might be a broad number of extraordinary
situations under which creditors could summarily seize a debtor's
property-all these hopes were dashed when the Fuentes decision
was handed down.
Fuentes differed in many respects from Sniadach. The most ob-
vious of these was that the creditor seizing the property had a secu-
rity interest in it, unlike the general unsecured creditor in Sniadach.
The stage was set to answer at least one of the major issues left
unanswered in Sniadach. Firestone, the creditor in Fuentes, seized,
under a typical replevin statute, a stereo and gas stove in the posses-
sion of Ms. Fuentes in which it (Firestone) had a security interest.
Firestone filed suit against Ms. Fuentes when, following a dispute
with Firestone, she failed to pay an installment due on the goods.
The replevy of her goods took place at once and her first notice of
the action occurred when the goods were seized. Before a three-judge
federal district court, the statute under which Firestone had reple-
vied Ms. Fuentes' goods was held constitutional.24 On appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded.
Sniadach, Justice Stewart said in writing for the majority of the
Court, should not be read as protecting only certain types of prop-
erty interests, such as necessities.25 The fourteenth amendment, he
22. Justice Harlan took no notice of the kind of property seized. Whatever its nature, he
implied, no property can be seized unless a hearing, at which an inquiry will be made into
the creditor's underlying claim, is provided the debtor prior to seizure. See 395 U.S. at 342-
43.
23. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
24. The statutes tested in the case were FLA. STAT. ANN., §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10, .13. See
407 U.S. at 73-74.
25. 407 U.S. at 88-90.
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continued, makes no such fine distinctions; property generally is
protected.2 1 So it was that in a brief span of an otherwise rather
lengthy opinion the hope was shattered of having Sniadach inter-
preted as requiring a pre-seizure hearing only where necessities-or
even more narrowly, wages-were concerned.
Other hopes were likewise dashed. Justice Douglas, recall, had
written in Sniadach that there could be unusual conditions
"requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest," and
this had given rise to the thought that secured creditors might have
an interest worthy of special protection. Firestone, in the Fuentes
case, was just such a secured creditor. Nevertheless, Justice Stew-
art, writing for the majority in the case, was ill-disposed to provide
such protection. His reading of past decisions in which pre-hearing
seizures had been allowed was much narrower than Douglas'.
There are, to be sure, situations in which seizing property summa-
rily will be constitutional. In Justice Stewart's opinion, however,
these situations must be "truly unusual." 2 He adds that in each
instance in which the Court has upheld pre-judgment seizure of
property with no notice or hearing "the seizure has been directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
26. Id. at 89-90.
27. 395 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added). The following cases were cited instances of situations
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest: Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. v Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928); and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). Of these four cases only the
Ownbey case involved a general interest, namely, attaching a nonresident debtor's property
in order to get quasi-in-rem jurisdiction (a procedure found constitutional in the case). All
the others involved state or public interests. In Fahey the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
appointed a conservator (in accordance with a statute empowering the Board to do so) for a
mismanaged bank; in the Ewing case, misbranded articles were condemned and seized by
the authority granted under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; in the Coffin Bros.
case a state superintendent of banks levied upon a shareholder of an insolvent bank in order
to meet creditor claims. So, while using somewhat broad language that special circumstances
might dictate protecting a creditor's interest, the only instance Douglas points to is that in
which the Court upheld a state's foreign attachment statute. See notes 8-10 supra, and
accompanying text. Employing attachment statutes for this latter purpose has recently been
declared unconstitutional. See note 147 infra.
28. 407 U.S. at 90. Justice Stewart cites those cases used by Justice Douglas in Sniadach.
See note 27 supra. But, as the text discloses, he puts a different reading on them. He also
cites McInnes v. McKay, 279 U.S. 820 (1929). This involved a general creditor in Maine
attaching a Maine debtor's property summarily. It is difficult to see what public or govern-
mental interest was being served in that case. Nonetheless it is there.
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interest."29 Seizing property prior to judgment to secure quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction is seen by Justice Stewart as "clearly a most basic
and important public interest."3 This, in his opinion, is not the case
where property is summarily seized in order to protect a creditor's
prior contractual interest in the property, the kind of interest which
Firestone had. What public interest would be served by giving Fire-
stone summary seizure power? While one might think of an answer
(e.g., contractual stability), Justice Stewart takes the position that
a creditor's claim, even a pre-existing consensual claim, to goods in
the possession of the debtor can hardly rise to the level of a general
public interest. There is here nothing more than private gain at
stake. A state's summary seizure statutes accomplish nothing more
exalted than allowing a creditor to satisfy a debt or settle a score.
And so Justice Stewart concludes: "[b]ut state intervention in a
private suit dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war
effort or protecting the public health."' 31 In the same cases in which
Justice Douglas (in Sniadach) had spotted a creditor interest that
was protected, Justice Stewart could spot none. Justice Douglas,
part of the majority in Fuentes, evidently underwent a change of
opinion, now that he had another opportunity to survey the cases.
So much then for the possibility that a secured creditor's interest
in goods might have been an interest elevated to the level of a public
interest deserving special protection.
The fact of the matter is that Justice Stewart makes no distinc-
tion between secured and unsecured creditors in Fuentes. This was
no mere oversight. The dissent, written by Justice White, saw the
difference as crucial. He urged the Court to throw this obvious dif-
ference into the balance. A secured creditor had as much right in
having the property protected as the debtor who had possession. To
protect this interest, the property could be seized and held pending
29. 407 U.S. at 91.
30. Id. n.23 (emphasis added). This appears to be the only instance where a private
creditor could seize property summarily in Justice Stewart's opinion. In any event, irre-
spective of whether Justice Douglas' opinions in Sniadach are any longer authoritative, using
summary seizure to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is no longer valid. See note 147, infra,
and accompanying text. Justice Stewart, unsupported by citations to cases, adds that immi-
nent danger that the debtor will destroy or conceal the goods might justify summary seizure.
407 U.S. at 93.
31. 407 U.S. at 93.
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outcome of the main suit. 2 But it was Justice Stewart's opinion, and
that of the majority for which he wrote,33 that it is the continued
peaceful possession of property that is covered by the due process
clause, as long as the one in possession has a significant interest in
the thing possessed.34 Notice and hearing before the taking, irrespec-
tive of how promptly the deprived party might by statute get the
goods returned,35 is, in his view, the only way to protect this absolute
right to continued peaceful poesession. Secured and general credi-
tors, one must conclude from Stewart's opinion, are on the same
footing. General creditors, in a prior hearing, would have to estab-
lish default and thus the right to some piece(s) of the debtor's prop-
erty; a secured creditor would have to establish default and thus the
right to a specific piece(s) of the debtor's property." In either case,
private gain, as was seen above, is all that is at stake. Creditors,
therefore, may not summarily seize their debtor's property, what-
ever the contractual arrangement concerning the property may have
been.
There remained only the final hope that the Fuentes Court would,
like the Court in Sniadach, recognize that there are extraordinary
situations in which a creditor might validly seize a debtor's property
without notice and hearing. Justice Douglas, in Sniadach, cited a
few instances in which the Court in the past had validated summary
seizure. But this part of his opinion was singularly opaque, giving
rise to several questions. Were the cases he cited37 to support the
proposition that the Court had, on occasion, validated seizure of
32. Id. at 97, 99-102.
33. The majority was a slim one. Only seven judges participated in the Fuentes decision.
This was to create some bitterness on the Court. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 615-17 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). And its precedential
quality was questioned openly in at least one case. In Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108
Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (1972), the Arizona court felt it was not bound by the 4-3
decision in Fuentes!
34. 407 U.S. at 86-87.
35. Id. at 80-82. Under the Florida statutory scheme, the only way the defendant could get
the seized property returned was by posting a bond, double in amount of the value of the
property. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.13 (Supp. 1972-73).
36. "Establish" default is used guardedly. The exact nature of the pre-seizure hearing was
nowhere spelled out in either Sniadach or Fuentes. Broadly speaking, it would appear that
the requirement would be that the plaintiff would have to prove the "probable validity of
the underlying claim." See 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. See notes 27 and 29 supra, and accompanying text.
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property prior to notice and hearing to be seen as the sole grounds
for such seizure? Or were the cases to be seen as merely suggestive?
Might not analogous situations arise, thus giving breadth to
"extraordinary" situations? If this latter view were taken, the argu-
ment that upon default by the debtor a secured creditor's right to
the protection of his interest in the property is such an extraordinary
situation deserving special protection might well carry the day. Jus-
tice Stewart, though, put what appeared to be a very narrow reading
on the extraordinary situations cases. The bypassing of elementary
due process (i.e., notice and a hearing prior to seizure of property)
had been endorsed by the Court, he observed, only in truly special
situations. In Justice Stewart's opinion the cases cited by Justice
Douglas when discussing this point in Sniadach disclosed the fol-
lowing:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance s
The passage itself is not free of ambiguity, which is why it was said
above that he "appeared" to be narrowing the extraordinary situa-
tions idea raised by Justice Douglas. If all three things must be
present before there is an extraordinary situation under which the
court would approve summary seizure, then the right to this process
would be rare indeed. The better view, however, is that any one of
the three will constitute an extraordinary situation. 9 In any event,
38. 407 U.S. at 91.
39. See, e.g., Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 Ky. L.J.
705, 709-11 (1976) [hereinafter Kay & Lubin]; Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's
Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RuTGERS
L. REv. 541, 555-56 (1975) [hereinafter Catz & Robinson]. Both articles point out that the
cases Justice Stewart cites in support of his threefold test indicates that each of the cases
had all three factors present, in which event summary seizure would be allowed in very few
instances. But as Catz and Robinson explain, Justice Stewart himself casts doubt on the
proposition that all three must be present in order to validate summary seizure. Immediately
following the threefold test Justice Stewart observes that immediate danger of a debtor
destroying goods could be an instance in which summary seizure will come into play. A
[Vol. 12:157
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Justice Stewart observed that the statutes in Fuentes-broadly
drawn, serving private interests only, with no state official deciding
the need for seizure-fell far short of minimal due process stan-
dards.4 0
With Fuentes, a great deal of certainty returned to the area of
provisional creditor remedies. Creditors generally may not have
liked the decision,"' but they knew where they stood. Local statutes
that failed to provide for notice and a hearing prior to seizure were
unconstitutional. Only in extraordinary instances-narrowly
spelled out in the statute-could notice and hearing be bypassed.
B. Mitchell and Di-Chem
These two cases revived somewhat the flagging hopes of creditors.
At the same time, however, these are the very cases that have cre-
ated the most confusion. The two are filled with obscurities and
inconsistencies. Nonetheless, some writers, as was pointed out ear-
lier, feel that discernible guidelines are emerging in spite of the
difficulties the cases present.
If there is confusion not capable of being clarified, it can be read-
ily accounted for. Mitchell was startlingly similar to Fuentes, but
the Louisiana statutes4 2 being tested in Mitchell were upheld while
those in Fuentes were struck down.4" In accordance with the Louis-
iana Code, the creditor in Mitchell seized property in which he had
a security interest. There was no notice nor a hearing prior to the
seizure. Now, if the statutes in Mitchell were to be upheld-and, of
course, they were-then Mitchell and Fuentes would be irreconcila-
ble, for Fuentes, and its rule requiring pre-seizure notice and hear-
ing except in truly extraordinary situations, applied whether the
creditor seizing disputed property had an interest in it or not.
fraudulent type act, in other words, would justify bypassing notice and hearing even if public
or governmental interests are absent. Kay & Lubin reach the same conclusion on different,
more involved grounds.
40. 407 U.S. at 90-93.
41. See note 12 supra.
42. These statutes appear as an appendix to Justice White's opinion, 416 U.S. at 620-23.
They are, by the way, the only statutes upheld in the Sniadach/Di-Chem line of cases.
43. Justice Stewart's dissent in Mitchell underscores the point that the two cases, the
statutes in both cases, were alike. He concluded that the Louisiana statute was indistin-
guishable from that overturned in Fuentes. 416 U.S. at 634.
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Fuentes, it would seem to follow, must be reversed. Yet, Justice
White, writing for a plurality of the Court, steadfastly refused to
overturn Fuentes. The two cases were reconcilable, in the eyes of the
majority, on their facts. Even though in both Fuentes and Mitchell
the creditors had a similar security interest in the property seized,
the statutory scheme under which the creditor seized the property
in Mitchell provided minimum due process protection for the debtor
that was lacking in Fuentes. In Justice White's words: "[W]e are
convinced that Fuentes was decided against a factual and legal
background sufficiently different from that now before us and that
it does not require the invalidation of the Louisiana sequestration
statute, either on its face or as applied in this case.""1
Justice White distinguished Fuentes on four grounds: (1) The
statutes in Mitchell required the creditor to allege under oath the
facts entitling him to the writ, whereas in Fuentes the creditor had
merely to make a bare assertion that he was entitled to a writ. (2)
The Louisiana statutes in Mitchell provided judicial control of the
summary seizure process from beginning to end; in Fuentes the
orders could be issued by a clerk of the court.45 (3) The statutes in
Mitchell were narrowly drawn. That is, the creditor, in order for the
judge to issue the writ by which the debtor's property could be
seized, had to assert only the fact that he had a lien on certain
described property. Such assertions are susceptible to documentary
proof, whereas in Fuentes, in order for the described property to be
replevied, the creditor had to allege that the property was being
wrongfully withheld, the kind of allegation that almost demands an
adversarial rather than an ex parte proceeding." (4) Unlike the
44. 416 U.S. at 615.
45. Concerning these first two grounds, the authors of a recent article had this to say:
It is interesting to note that both of these grounds for distinction have close analogies
in the criminal field: the validity of warrants for arrest or search has long been held to
depend not only on their issuance by a judicial officer but also on whether the facts
have been presented to that officer from which he can independently judge whether
or not probable cause exists. It is almost as if the Mitchell Court is carrying into the
due process clause the very special requirements of the fourth amendment.
Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 560-61 (footnote omitted).
46. See 416 U.S. at 617. As Catz and Robinson point out in their article, this third ground
of distinction has a "first-blush rationality about it .... " Catz & Robinson, supra note 39,
at 560. In point of fact, however, the Louisiana statutes required a person seeking the seques-
tration of property to allege facts hardly susceptible to documentary proof. For instance, if
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statutes in Fuentes, the Louisiana Code provided the defendant
with an opportunity for an immediate post-seizure hearing at which
the burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove the grounds upon
which the writ was issued.
A statutory scheme, then, with these protective features will pass
constitutional muster, but there is one major proviso: even with
these protective features a pre-seizure hearing can be dispensed
with only if the creditor has a pre-existing interest in the property.
This is clearly the rationale of the case, a point concerning which
writers on this topic are in general agreement. For instance, Catz
and Robinson observe: "[t]he whole thrust of the Mitchell majority
opinion is merely an elaboration of his [White's] dissent in
Fuentes. "I' In that dissent Justice White had argued that a credi-
tor's secured interest in property held by an alleged defaulting
debtor was an interest deserving protection. This could be accom-
plished by seizing the property and keeping it in custody pending
the outcome of the preliminary hearing that would follow. The cred-
itor's iiterest, therefore, could justify by-passing pre-seizure notice
and hearing requirements if the debtor is provided the other safe-
guards, i.e., fact pleading, judicial control and so on. The creditor's
pre-existing interest in the property is the crucial factor in the dis-
sent." If the creditor has no pre-existing interest in the debtor's
property and is merely a general unsecured creditor, the debtor is
entitled to notice and hearing prior to seizure.
If the creditor has a special interest in the property the process
due the debtor undergoes change. The dissenter in Fuentes writes
this in Mitchell:
one were proceeding under some theory other than a lien theory to sequester property an
allegation had to be made that ". . . it is within the power of the defendant to conceal,
dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the
parish." LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961). Surely these are the kind of allega-
tions the proof of which require adversary rather than ex parte proceedings. It is true enough
that in Mitchell the creditor, proceeding under a lien theory, had only to show the existence
of the lien and default. Still, other proceedings are possible under the statute. But Justice
White said that the statute on its face and the facts as applied in the case provided defendants
with the minimum protection required under the Constitution. This result is achieved, as
Catz and Robinson observe, ". . . only at the expense of serious constriction of the statute."
Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 560.
47. Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 558.
48. See 407 U.S. at 100-01.
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Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered
by the court is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The
question is not whether a debtor's property may be seized by his
creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in the
property sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller and buyer
had current, real interests in the property, and the definition of prop-
erty rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process
question must take account not only of the interests of the buyer of
the property but those of the seller as well.
With this duality in mind, we are convinced that the Louisiana
sequestration procedure is not invalid, either on its face or as ap-
plied. 9
In sum, it seemed clear after Mitchell that, assuming other safe-
guards are available to the debtor, a creditor with a prior interest
in property could have it summarily seized. There being no such
interest, Sniadach and Fuentes would apply to prohibit summary
seizure. All of this put the status of Fuentes in doubt. Justice White
had distinguished Fuentes, but Justice Stewart was unable to do so.
Even though Justice White steadfastly refused to overturn Fuentes,
the case, as one writer recently put it, may have been alive but the
state of its health was serious.
Nathaniel Hansford, one of the principals in the Di-Chem case
and the author of a recent article about it,"' intimates that the
Supreme Court's decision in the Di- Chem case was "curious. '5 2 In-
deed. Striking similarities to earlier cases were present once more
as Di- Chem and Sniadach bore strong resemblances to one another
in almost every major regard save one. In Di-Chem, as in Sniadach,
a creditor (Di-Chem) had effectively frozen a debtor's (Northern
Georgia's) property by garnishment in accordance with Georgia
statutes which had no pregarnishment notice or hearing provisions,
much like those in Wisconsin. The major regard, then, in which the
two cases differed is that in Sniadach a consumer's wages were
49. 416 U.S. at 604-05.
50. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Proce-
dural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807, 832 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
51. Hansford, Procedural Due Process in the Debtor-Creditor Relationship: The Impact of
Di-Chem, 9 GA. L. Rev. 589 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hansford].
52. Id. at 597-609 (for a more detailed account of the course of events from the filing of
the case in the Georgia state courts to its resolution).
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garnished, whereas in Di-Chem it was a business' (Northern Geor-
gia's) commercial bank account that was garnished.
When Northern Georgia's problems began, Sniadach and Fuentes
had been decided. Mitchell had not. Which is to say that statutes
failing to provide for pre-seizure notice and hearing except in ex-
traordinary situations were unconstitutional. Surprisingly, however,
the Georgia Supreme Court found the statutes constitutional. 3
Fuentes was ignored54 and, the court reasoned, Sniadach applied
only to wages: all other property, as had always been the case, was
subject to summary seizure." By ignoring Fuentes, the Georgia Su-
preme Court found a critical difference between wage earners and
commercial debtors. Meanwhile, in another case,56 a three-judge
federal district court held the same Georgia statutes unconstitu-
tional. Certiorari was subsequently granted the petitioners in Di-
Chem, as could be expected under the circumstances.17
Before the case was heard, the Mitchell decision was handed
down. Nevertheless, a favorable judgment for the petitioning debtor
in Di-Chem could still be reasonably expected. The Mitchell deci-
sion may have represented a retreat from Fuentes in that pre-seizure
notice and a hearing were no longer required in all cases:19 a creditor
53. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 263-64, 201 S.E.2d 321,
324 (1973).
54. There was precedent for ignoring Fuentes, or at any rate giving it the figurative back
of the hand. See note 33 supra.
55. The Georgia court's view that Sniadach should apply to wages only was not without
precedent. Other courts refused to extend Sniadach beyond that narrow limit. See Reeves v.
Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmer-
man, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach.
Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1970); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969).
56. Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
57. The circumstance other than this open split between the federal and state courts was
that the Supreme Court had, up to Di-Chem, dealt with consumer attachments and garnish-
ments, the apparent major distinction between Di-Chem and Sniadach at that time. See
Hansford, supra note 51, at 598-99. Should the property of a commercial debtor be given
different, perhaps lesser protection, was a question yet to be answered by the Court. Di-Chem,
of course, presented that issue directly to the Court. But it must be kept in mind that
Mitchell still had not been decided.
58. See Hansford, supra note 51, at 603-04.
59. Pre-seizure notice and a hearing were previously not required except in extraordinary
situations. See notes 37-40 supra, and accompanying text. This issue was not raised, however,
in Di-Chem.
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with a secured interest in particular property might validly seize it
prior to judgment. The creditor in Di-Chem, however, had no such
interest.'" Therefore, Sniadach and the now narrowed Fuentes ap-
plied-notice and a hearing had to be provided the debtor prior to
seizing property, providing of course the debtor had a cognizable
interest in the property.61 Since there were no provisions for notice
or a hearing prior to seizure, it followed, so the appellants argued, 2
the Georgia statutes were unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court was destined to agree. It did so in a manner
that was to create the storm of criticism referred to earlier.
Again writing for the majority, Justice White began by citing both
Sniadach and Fuentes favorably, but the latter only to support the
proposition that deprivation of property, even though the length
and severity may vary, is still a taking. Quoting Fuentes, the Court
again stated that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright
lines around a three-day, ten-day, or fifty-day deprivation of prop-
erty. Any significant taking of property by the state is within the
purview of the Due Process Clause. 6 3 Justice White also cited
Fuentes and Sniadach to support the proposition that deprivation
of the property of commercial as well as consumer defendants falls
within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Having such
arguments at its disposal, the conclusion of the Court would seem
readily predictable. But Mr. Hansford describes the surprising route
the Court chose to take. "After citing Fuentes with approval," he
writes, "the Court curiously failed to take the further step of declar-
ing the Georgia procedure unconstitutional on the ground that it
lacked the pre-seizure notice and hearing demanded by Fuentes.
Instead, the Court compared the Georgia statutes with the Louis-
iana sequestration procedure upheld in Mitchell and struck down
the Georgia scheme because it lacked the adequate safeguards
found in Mitchell. "65
60. In addition, the Georgia statutes under attack in Di-Chem did not have the other
protective features provided an aggrieved debtor under the Louisiana statutes. See notes 45
and 46 supra, and accompanying text.
61. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
62. See Hansford, supra note 51, at 603.
63. 419 U.S. at 606.
64. Id. at 608.
65. Hansford, supra note 51, at 603-04.
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Fuentes, narrowed and even thought dead in many quarters, was
definitely alive, but barely, standing evidently only for limited prin-
ciples. More importantly, Mitchell, thought to apply only if the
plaintiff had a pre-existing interest in property summarily seized,
was applied in Di-Chem, where the plaintiff was a general unse-
cured creditor.
As has been indicated several times, the statutes in Fuentes were
struck down because they failed to provide defendants with pre-
seizure notice and hearing-or so most everyone thought. Referring
to Fuentes in Di-Chem, however, Justice White stated that
"[blecause the official seizures had been carried out without notice
and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguards against
mistaken repossession they [the statutes challenged in Fuentes]
were held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."66 Other
safeguards? If there were any safeguards other than pre-seizure
notice and hearing that would satisfy due process, the Fuentes
decision neglected to mention them. Justice White, in Di-Chem,
obviously meant those safeguards found in Mitchell because imme-
diately following the passage quoted above he repeats the Mitchell
safeguards and finds that the Georgia statute has none of them. The
Mitchell safeguards, then, are such that will serve the same purpose
as pre-seizure notice and hearing, even if the plaintiff is a general
unsecured creditor.17 But, Justice White observed, the Georgia stat-
utes had "none" of the safeguards."
The Louisiana statutes in Mitchell were found to have four safe-
guards against mistaken seizure,69 the presence of which justified
by-passing pre-seizure notice and hearing. Justice White, for rea-
sons he left unexplained, recounts only three in Di-Chem, leaving
out the requirement that the statute be narrowly drawn to the ex-
tent that a plaintiff's claim is susceptible to documentary proof.7"
66. 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
67. Justice White observed that the Mitchell statutes, the ones that provided the other
safeguards that were valid substitutes for pre-seizure notice and hearing, "permitted the
seller-creditor holding a vendor's lien to seize summarily the debtor's property." 419 U.S. at
606-07. The Mitchell statutes did indeed permit a limited kind of creditor to use the summary
process. But Justice White, for whatever reason, chose not to pursue the distinction, even
after mentioning it. He would now have the safeguards apply to unsecured creditors.
68. 419 U.S. at 607.
69. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
70. 419 U.S. at 607.
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An oversight? Or might a statute have the other three and not this
latter and still pass constitutional muster?
Catz and Robinson suggest the possibility that not only may the
requirement Justice White failed to include be dispensed with but
that the presence of any of one of the Mitchell safeguards may make
a statute constitutionally sufficient.7' Justice White had, after all,
said that the Georgia statutes failed for the same reasons as those
in Fuentes and that they were not saved by the Mitchell test be-
cause they contained none of the safeguards found in the Louisiana
statutes." None? Can it be inferred that had the Georgia statutes
provided the defendant with even one safeguard the statutes would
thereby have been upheld? Catz and Robinson suggest that it is
possible to make such an inference. But taking Justice White's
"none of the savings characteristics" language in context, the infer-
ence suggested seems invalid. After making the assertion Justice
White identifies the three areas in which the Georgia statute fails.
The Georgia statute simply fails on all counts to provide minimal
due process protection. In addition, Justice White in reinterpreting
Fuentes said that pre-seizure notice and a hearing or other
safeguards (plural) were needed to guard against mistaken seizure."
Something more than simply an early hearing following seizure
would be needed before a statutory scheme of provisional remedies
could pass constitutional muster.
Justice White wrote that the Georgia statute had "no provision
for an early hearing."7 In Mitchell he had stressed the fact that the
Louisiana statutes provided the defendant with the right to a hear-
ing immediately following seizure. 5 Does this mean, for example, a
statute is constitutional if it requires a hearing seven days after the
seizure of property, assuming of course that other safeguards are
present? This may be early but it certainly is not immediate, at
least not in the sense in which the right to a hearing was provided
in Louisiana. It could be argued that such a statute would be valid,
71. See Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 563-64.
72. See note 68 supra, and accompanying text.
73. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
74. 419 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
75. 416 U.S. at 610.
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that the Mitchell requirement of an immediate hearing had been
modified .76
On the other hand, "early" rather than "immediate" more aptly
describes the realities of Mitchell. This is the way the "immediate"
hearing events unfolded in Mitchell. On February 2, 1972, W. T.
Grant Co. filed suit against Mitchell. On February 7 the sheriff
executed the writ of sequestration. 7 Although Mitchell could have
filed a motion to have the writ dissolved at once, he waited until
March 3 to do so. The motion was heard on March 14 and was
denied on March 16. In short, eleven days elapsed from the time the
motion was filed until it was heard (presumably the same amount
of time would have expired had Mitchell filed his motion immedi-
ately). And yet Justice White said the Louisiana statute was "not
invalid, either on its face or as applied. "Is Apparently, a statute may
provide for an immediate hearing, and if it takes eleven days it is
still considered "immediate." An early hearing, quite obviously, is
all that is required and is in reality what took place in Mitchell; the
statute as it was applied was constitutionally adequate.
On the whole, then, Di-Chem could justifiably be portrayed as a
singularly unsatisfactory performance. Justice Blackmun in dissent
felt the Court gave an insufficient explanation of the standards used
in striking down the Georgia statutes. As a result, doubts were cast
over the constitutionality of similar statutes in other states.79 Many
critics agreed that the Di-Chem decision only added to the confu-
sion in the field of creditor's remedies. 0
76. It has been so argued. "[Niotice and opportunity for an early hearing, is less stringent
than the 'immediate' hearing requirement of the Mitchell statute . 63 GEO. L. REv.
1337, 1346 (1975) (emphasis added).
77. There was some doubt about the actual date of execution. February 7 was settled upon.
See 416 U.S. at 603 n.2.
78. 416 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added).
79. Justice Blackmun, with whom Jutice Rehnquist joined, said:
One gains the impression . .. that the Court is endeavoring to say as little as
possible in explaining just why the Supreme Court of Georgia is being reversed. And,
as a result, the corresponding commercial statutes of all other states . . . are left in
questionable constitutional status, with little or no applicable standard by which to
measure and determine their validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. This, it
seems to me, is an undesirable state of affairs. ...
419 U.S. at 614.
80. One writer's conclusion was that "[Di-Chem] increased the confusion surrounding the
constitutional standard by which creditor's remedies are to be measured. [Di-Chem] will
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Another disturbing aspect of the case is that the appellants' vic-
tory in Di-Chem may be pyrrhic from the viewpoint of debtors gen-
erally. If the Mitchell standards are to be applied even when the
creditor has no pre-existing rights in the property seized, then rights
of creditors to provisional remedies are not too dissimilar from those
available prior to Sniadach.8' The majority seemed mindful of the
fact that it was willing to protect the interests of unsecured credi-
tors, for Justice Powell in the lone concurring opinion wrote:
Garnishment and attachment remedies afford the actual or poten-
tial judgment creditor a means of assuring, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, that the debtor will not remove from the jurisdiction,
encumber, or otherwise dispose of certain assets then available to
satisfy the creditor's claim. Garnishment may have a seriously ad-
verse impact on the debtor, depriving him of the use of his assets
during the period that it applies. But this fact alone does not give rise
to constitutional objection. The State's legitimate interest in facili-
tating creditor recovery through the provision of garnishment reme-
dies has never been seriously questioned. 2
This may obscure83 the real differences of interests between se-
cured and unsecured creditors, but the point is the Court appears
to have determined that the interests of unsecured creditors are
produce chaos and confusion for those lawyers, judges and others who must work with the
numerous pre-judgment seizure statutes." 1975 Wis. L. REv. 860, 873-74. After making similar
observations, however, most thoughtful critics saw Di-Chem as not being totally without
merit; it does have certain guidelines. This, of course, is the position taken in this article.
Mr. Hansford agrees, even after sharply attacking Di-Chem, that guidelines are available for
legislative draftsmen to safely follow. See Hansford, supra note 51, at 608-09.
81. It has been suggested that there is an entirely different way to look at Di-Chem. The
majority may have been saying that the Georgia statutes offered so little protection against
mistakingly depriving a debtor of property that they not only failed the strict Fuentes stan-
dards (applicable where the creditor has no prior interest in the property) but also failed to
pass even the much more liberal Mitchell standards (normally applicable only where a cre-
ditor has a prior interest in the property). "It may be that the [Di-Chem] majority takes
the position that certain minimal procedural requirements must be fulfilled before any bal-
ancing of interests is necessary .... But if this is the case, the Court should have made it
explicit." 1975 Wis. L. REV. 860, 872-73. There is little in Di-Chem, however, to justify a claim
that the majority even implicitly takes this position.
82. 419 U.S. at 610.
83. Catz & Robinson say that Powell's opinion puts secured and unsecured creditors on
the same footing. Both interests, in his view, are worth protecting. See Catz & Robinson,
supra note 39, at 565. See note 115 infra, for a fuller discussion of this point.
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sufficient to warrant protection 54-if minimum safeguards are pro-
vided the defendant. The minimum safeguards were absent in Geor-
gia. Had they been present, the Court seems to say clearly enough,
the garnishment would have withstood the challenge. There would
have been no balancing of the debtor's and creditor's interest in the
property. The property would have been frozen pending the out-
come of the early hearing or ultimate resolution of the main suit.
In short, Di-Chem expanded the scope of Mitchell, thought to en-
compass only secured creditors, and at the same time modified the
Mitchell safeguards by requiring an "early" rather than an
"immediate" hearing.
Carey v. Sugar,15 a case following closely upon the heels of Di-
Chem, seems to support such a reading of Di-Chem. Carey, a per
curiam decision, is no monument to clarity, but it does cast needed
light on the shadowy outlines that can be perceived dimly in Di-
Chem. In Carey the plaintiff garnished, in accordance with New
York statutes, a debt owed by a third party to the defendant-a fact
situation akin to that in Di-Chem. The statutory scheme the plain-
tiff employed gave plaintiffs seeking a money judgment the right to
garnish (or attach) any time prior to judgment, and the plaintiff did
not need to have any pre-existing interest in the property garnished
or attached." Unlike the Georgia statutes in Di-Chem, the grounds
bestowing upon the plaintiff the right to attach or garnish were quite
limited. Broadly speaking, the defendant must have fraudulently
conveyed the garnished property, or have hidden it, or have commit-
84. Justice White does not give these or any similar reasons why an unsecured creditor
should be due the Mitchell test. He appears content, as the text will subsequently demon-
strate, to let the Mitchell safeguards substitute for pre-seizure notice and hearing.
85. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (decided together with Curtis Circulation Co. v.
Sugar, also on appeal from the same court).
86. The plaintiff employed the New York Attachment Statute, which provided the follow-
ing:
An order of attachment may be granted without notice, before or after service of
summons and at any time prior to judgment. It shall specify the amount of the plain-
tiff's demand, be indorsed with the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney and
shall be directed to the sheriff of any county or of the city of New York where any
property in which the defendant has an interest is located or where a garnishee may
be served. The order shall direct the sheriff to levy within his jurisdiction, at any time
before final judgment, upon such property in which the defendant has an interest and
upon such debts owing to the defendant as will satisfy the plaintiff's demand together
with probable interest, costs, and sheriff's fees and expenses.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6211 (McKinney 1963).
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ted similar quasi-criminal acts before the writ giving the plaintiff
the right to summarily seize would issue. 7 The scheme, as will be
seen, differed from the Georgia statutes in other respects as well.
A three judge district court, 8 using Fuentes and Mitchell as au-
thority, 9 found the New York statutes unconstitutional. The court
noted that the New York statutes were similar in some respects to
the statutes upheld in Mitchell.9" Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the hearing provision was improper because it placed the bur-
den of proof on the defendant to show the attachment was not
necessary, rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove his underlying
claim.9" The New York statute also failed, said the court, because
it allowed summary seizure by a creditor who had no pre-existing
87. Section 6201, in its relevant parts, provided the following:
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action,
where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the
alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when: . . .
4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has assigned, disposed of or
secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts; or
5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has been guilty
of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability; or...
8. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the conversion of personal prop-
erty, or for fraud or deceit.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 6201 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976-77).
88. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. Sniadach, the three-judge court felt, was unnecessary to the decision. Sugar v. Curtis
Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. at 646. Di-Chem, of course, had yet to be decided, though it
was to be argued within a month following the lower court's decision.
90. At the outset, the court compared the New York statutes to those tested in Mitchell
and concluded that the New York statutes were unconstitutional; there were, however, sev-
eral points at which the statutes compared favorably with those upheld in Mitchell. For
instance, before the writ would issue the plaintiff had to provide bond that would indemnify
the defendant in the event the plaintiff lost the suit; a judge, based on affidavits filed by
plaintiff, determined if the writ would issue; and defense motions to dismiss would be heard
promptly. 383 F. Supp. at 648.
91. The New York law did provide the defendant the right to a post-seizure hearing in
which to move to dismiss the attachment. The district court concluded, however, that the
New York statutes failed to provide the right kind of hearing. The Louisiana statutes in
Mitchell required the plaintiff to prove his underlying claim and put the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, whereas the New York statutes required a hearing in which the defendant was
required to prove that the attachment was unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff. Proof
of the validity of the underlying claim was not at issue, and the burden of proof of the issue
being heard was shifted to the defendant. 383 F. Supp. at 648-49. These two grounds were
enough to invalidate the New York statutes. The court, however, found the statutes deficient
for two additional reasons. See notes 92 & 93 infra, and accompanying text.
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interest in the property.9 2 Finally, the statute failed because the
grounds upon which an attachment order was granted were not
subject to documentary proof.93 All of which put the Carey case
more "within the Fuentes rather than the Mitchell zone."94 That,
of course, is to say that unless there are truly extraordinary situa-
tions present, and these specified in a narrowly drawn statute, prop-
erty may not be seized prior to notice and hearing. Thus, on four
separate grounds the New York statutes were defective, at least in
the eyes of the three-judge court.
On appeal the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, ordering
the court to abstain from a decision until New York state courts
construed the statutes. The abstention doctrine may have been
employed but the per curiam decision is instructive all the same.
About the decision below, the Court said:
As we understand it, the District Court found the New York pre-
judgment attachment provisions unconstitutional because it con-
cluded that the opportunity to vacate the attachment provided by
CPLR § 6223 was inadequate, under this Court's cases, to justify the
property deprivation involved. In its view, the hearing available on a
motion to vacate the attachment was inadequate principally because
the hearing would only be concerned with the question whether the
"attachment is unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff," § 6223,
and would not require the plaintiff to litigate the question of the
likelihood that it would ultimately prevail on the merits. 5
92. Mitchell's scope, i.e., the right to seize property summarily, was limited to instances
in which the creditor had a pre-existing interest in the property seized. There was, the court
noted, no such interest in the property seized by the creditor in the Carey case, and no such
interest was required to be shown before a writ would issue. 383 F. Supp. at 649. By and large
this is the case with most attachment and garnishment writs. Replevin or detinue, usually
so called, are used when one hopes to seize property in which there is a pre-existing interest.
See note 5 supra.
93. The court noted that in Mitchell the facts needed to be established before the writ of
sequestration was granted were evident and subject to documentary proof. In New York,
however, attachment was ordered in the event of fraud, deceit or conversion-difficult
issues best handled in adversary proceedings and not susceptible to documentary proof. 383
F. Supp. at 649-50. Fuentes had statutes with similar defects.
94. 383 F. Supp. at 649.
95. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 77 (1976). Relegated to footnote status were two other
grounds the three-judge court had found for overturning the New York statutes. About these
grounds, the Court said, "The court [three-judge court below] also concluded that the
burden of proof at the hearing would be on the defendant, and noted that the plaintiff unlike
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The Supreme Court chose to send the case back to await state court
interpretation, feeling that the New York courts might very well
hold that the early hearing will go to the merits of the underlying
claim.
Would such a finding alone, however, be enough to save the
statutes? That is, may a pre-seizure hearing be dispensed with even
if the plaintiff has no special interest in the property? Must the
burden of proof be on the plaintiff that he will ultimately prevail
on the merits? Must allegations in the original motion for a writ be
those easily subject to documentary proof? None of these provisions
were in the New York statute. The answer to each of these seems
clearly to be "no." The Court, in the following, provided the answer:
The precise nature of any inquiry into the merits which will be made
under this rubric [that an attachment may be vacated in New York
if it clearly appears that the plaintiff must ultimately fail on the
merits-an earlier holding by the New York Court of Appeals] is
unclear, but an inquiry consistent with the constitutional standard
is by no means automatically precluded. Indeed, two New York trial
courts have expressly held, subsequent to the decision below, that
where fact issues are raised, on a motion to vacate an attachment,
the plaintiff in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co .... has no special property interest in the
property atached." Id. at 77 n.2. Ignored altogether was the lower courts' holding that the
New York statute allowed writs to issue in an ex parte proceeding even though the allegations
made by plaintiffs were those normally thought best decided by adversary proceedings be-
cause such issues are not susceptible to documentary proof. Likewise ignored was the fact
that the three-judge court found several points concerning which the New York statutes met
the Mitchell standards. Specifically, the lower court approved of the following requirements
found in the, New York statutes: (1) that there must be judicial approval of an affidavit
showing that there is a cause of action and grounds for issuing an order of attachment (or
garnishment) before the writ will be granted; (2) that the plaintiff must post an indemnifying
bond; and (3) that the defendant can regain possession of the property by posting bond. 383
F. Supp. at 648. These protective features were not enough to save the statutes. But since
the Supreme Court, in its preoccupation with the prompt post-seizure hearing issue failed to
mention these constitutionally laudatory features, it is reasonable to ask if their absence, even
though a prompt hearing at *hich the underlying cause of action is litigated is provided,
would be fatal to an attachment statute. The best that can be said is that their presence along
with a prompt hearing will create a statutory scheme that is certain to pass a test of its
constitutionality. But in Di-Chem, decided after the three-judge decision below, the Court
had ignored the Mitchell distinction of special interest in the property seized, the burden of
proof problem, and the problem of the narrowly drawn statute, although, as previously re-
marked upon, exactly what was to be made of these gaps in Di-Chem was cause for debate.
See text accompanying notes 65-78 supra.
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with respect to the merits of the underlying claim, a preliminary
hearing will be held on those issues .... Under these circumstances,
it would be unwise for this Court to address the constitutionality of
the New York attachment statutes, for decision on that issue may be
rendered unnecessary by a decision of the New York courts as a
matter of state law .... 96
In short, if the New York courts read into the statute that at the
post-seizure hearing the merits of the plaintiff's underlying cause of
action will be litigated, the Supreme Court will be satisfied, if the
other minimal safeguards that both the Louisiana and New York
statutes had in common are present. 7 The Court will be satisfied
with a statutory scheme that favorably matches the Mitchell re-
quirements as modified in Di-Chem. The plaintiff need have no
special interest in the property in order to have access to summary
seizure; the burden of proof need not necessarily be on the plaintiff
to prove the ultimate validity of the underlying claim; the allega-
tions necessary for securing a writ need not be those peculiarly
suited to documentary proof. But both the Louisiana and New York
statutes required that a judge issue the writ and that, before the writ
would issue, a bond be posted that would indemnify the defendant
in the event the plaintiff ultimately failed in the suit.
Carey, therefore, has brought more sharply into focus the dim
outlines that emerged from Di-Chem and Mitchell. Given certain
other minimal safeguards, 8 it now appears that an early hear-
ing-at which the merits of the underlying claim will be liti-
gated-following the seizure of disputed property is a statutory
scheme that will pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court in
Carey saw this early hearing as crucial, as did the federal district
court (keeping in mind that the district court saw other grounds for
striking down the statutes, grounds unheeded by the Supreme Court
on appeal).
Near the end of the Carey opinion, the Court makes this observa-
tion: "The court below has declared unconstitutional the statute of
a state the continued utilization of which is undoubtedly of import-
96. 425 U.S. at 78 (footnotes and citations omitted).
97. See note 95 supra.
98. Id.
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ance to that state."99 Well, it hardly needs saying but the court
below declared the New York statutes unconstitutional on the
strength of Mitchell. The fact that a state may have long utilized
such creditor's remedies would seem to have been of little import-
ance, even after Mitchell. Be that as it may, the quoted passage
carries echoes of Holmes' opinion in the Bennett case cited earlier.
And well it might, for as Professor Robert E. Scott has remarked,
"The path from Sniadach to Di-Chem is circular."'' 0 True, and
Carey underscores this.
II. SOME THEORIES: CLARIFICATION OF THE EMERGING GUIDELINES' 01
A. Professor Rendleman and the Multistep Analysis Theory
Recently Professor Doug Rendleman wrote that Mr. Justice
Blackmun's dissent in the Di-Chem case was, at least in part, en-
tirely correct. That part is Justice Blackmun's statement that the
"sparse comparison"''0 2 test, which the Court seemed to adopt in Di-
Chem, destroyed doctrinal purity and cast statutory remedies for
creditors into a constitutional netherworld. In spite of this, Professor
Rendleman's position is that the decisions from Sniadach through
Di-Chem "can be reconciled and. . . systematic due process adju-
dication is not only possible, but, if a rational and socially respon-
sive jurisprudence is to be created, necessary."'" 3 General agreement
with this statement has produced a number of theories through
which it can be seen that though the path the Court has taken has
been circular it has not been aimlessly wandering as some critics
suggest.
99. 425 U.S. at 79.
100. Scott, supra note 50, at 833.
101. The writers chosen, needless to say, by no means constitute an exhaustive list of those
whose theories have been put forth in the hope of constructing some sort of rational underpin-
ning for the Sniadach line of cases. The list is indeed an imposing one. See note 5 supra.
Consequently, the views discussed in this portion of the text were chosen for highly subjective
reasons. It is urged therefore that the works chosen be read in full. In any event, the theories
presented are felt to be representative of that lengthy and imposing list, and offer special
qualities beyond being merely representative. There is, of course, always the danger that the
theories have been misunderstood and consequently presented in a distorting light. If that
happens to be the case, apologies are due and are, hereby, given.
102. 395 U.S. at 726.
103. Rendleman, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Rendleman].
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Professor Rendleman's article, written after Di-Chem but prior to
Carey, 04 puts forth the proposition that in the Sniadach line of cases
the Court devised a "multistep analysis."'' 5 In Sniadach and
Fuentes the Court employed only a two-step analysis; Mitchell
added the third step.
In the Sniadach/Fuentes two-step analysis the debtor first had to
show a constitutionally cognizable interest in the property. At the
second level an inquiry was made into the process due such a debtor.
Except in emergencies, due process consisted of a pre-seizure hear-
ing at which the creditor had to establish the probable validity of
his underlying claim."0 6
Mitchell and Fuentes, Professor Rendleman concludes, are recon-
cilable: in fact the two cases are in his hands fused in such a fashion
as to form the very substance of the multistep analysis.' In ad-
dressing this problem of reconciliation he says, "Mitchell merely
refines the due process multistep analysis by inserting an inquiry as
to the nature of the interest, sole or dual, between the determina-
tions of the existence of the constitutionally cognizable interest and
of the process due."'08 Once there is a determination that interests
in the seized property are dual (which of course implies that both
debtor and creditor have cognizable interests) the process due un-
dergoes a fundamental change. Dual interests bring into play the
application of the more relaxed Mitchell protective features.1 9 If the
debtor alone has an interest in the disputed property, the process
due is different and the Fuentes rule will apply 10
Up to this point Professor Rendleman makes a persuasive argu-
ment, but then came Di-Chem, a case analytically unsound in his
opinion. The Court, Professor Rendleman says, "failed satisfactorily
104. At the time Professor Rendleman was writing his article Carey v. Sugar had been
granted review by the Supreme Court. He notes the potential this case carried for fleshing
out the theory offered in his article. His hopes, however, as the text of his article demon-
strates, were left unfulfilled. See Rendleman, supra note 103.
105. Rendleman, supra note 103, at 41-44. This multi-step analysis is also referred to by
Rendleman as a three step due process analysis. Id.
106. Rendleman, supra note 103.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 40.
109. See the text accompanying notes 45-46 supra, for the Mitchell standards.
110. Rendleman, supra note 103, at 41.
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to integrate [Di-Chem] with prior decisions,"'" when presented
with the perfect opportunity to do so. The Court need not have even
brought up the Mitchell factors, for these are applicable only if
interests are dual, and the interests in Di-Chem were sole, i.e., only
the debtor had an interest in the property.1 2 Consequently, Profes-
sor Rendleman concludes, courts may now allow plaintiffs with no
interest in the seized property to get Mitchell treatment as if they
had an interest."3 Fuentes, in short, if the Court continues to ignore
the multistep analysis, is narrowed if not destroyed entirely.
Professor Rendleman's exposition aside for the moment, Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion in Di-Chem, seems to be using the
multistep analysis in that he appears to find an "interest" possessed
by the creditor (who, it will be recalled, was a mere general unse-
cured creditor) that deserved protection; therefore, the Mitchell test
would be applicable.' Catz and Robinson point out that this
"papers over" the real differences between secured and unsecured
creditors, and perhaps, more importantly, places no real limit on
analysis."' That is, every creditor has an interest in wanting prop-
erty ready at hand for the satisfaction of a judgment, assuming a
judgment is obtained. Thus every creditor would be on the same
footing as the one in Mitchell and thus come under the Mitchell
rule. Multistep is reduced to dual step; in effect there would be a
return, on a modified level, to a pre-Sniadach posture.
Carey v. Sugar, as Professor Rendleman points out, afforded the
Court the opportunity of clarifying the multistep analysis, because
the plaintiff in the case had no prior interest in the garnished prop-
111. Id. at 41.
112. Id. at 42.
113. Id. at 43-44.
114. 419 U.S. at 609-10.
115. Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 565-66. Secured and unsecured creditors have
genuinely different interests. The latter's deserve protection, a ]a Mitchell.
The most significant differences for due process purposes are that, in the case of the
secured transaction: (1) the debtor has given up rights in the property through his
voluntary action and therefore may be said to have consented to the subsequent inter-
ruption of his possession; (2) the rights are in specific property, so that the chances of
wrongful or mistaken seizure are reduced; and (3) the creditor's rights in the collateral
are normally spelled out in the security agreement, making them, according to the
Mitchell rationale, more susceptible of documentary proof.
Id. at 565.
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erty. The Court, of course, failed to take advantage of the opportun-
ity, preferring instead to invoke Mitchell, and Mitchell as modified
by Di-Chem at that.
So Carey v. Sugar, instead of returning to the multistep analysis,
stands for its demise. But, oddly, the demise of this analysis, once
so clear and promising, has helped shed light on the path the Court
is now taking. The question of there being a sole or dual interest in
disputed property is one no longer to be thrown onto the
scales-that much seems clear. Clear also is the resemblance of the
present state of the law to the situation prior to Sniadach.
B. Kay and Lubin and Validation by Means of Extraordinary
Situations
Richard S. Kay and Harold M. Lubin have offered another theory
aimed at reconciling and providing a rational underpinning to the
Sniadach line of cases."' Not an easy task, they admit: "These cases
have been cited as an arch-example of inconsistency, even irration-
ality, in constitutional doctrine.""11 Mitchell and Di-Chem, they
argue, can be seen as consistent with Fuentes, if it is kept in mind
that Fuentes did not call for pre-seizure notice and hearing in all
cases. Justice Stewart in Fuentes said that in extraordinary situa-
tions summary seizure would be valid."' The statutory scheme
being tested in Mitchell passed because the statutes dealt with an
extraordinary situation-the third of the three that Justice Stewart
had spelled out in Fuentes. The Court, Justice Stewart opined,
would tolerate dispensing with pre-seizure notice if "the state has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a governmental official responsible
for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance." 9
Kay and Lubin's position is that this third exception is satisfied
if, as in Mitchell, a neutral official (judge) determines, in accord-
ance with a statute limiting his discretion, that summary seizure
116. Kay & Lubin, supra note 39.
117. Id. at 705.
118. 407 U.S. at 90-92; see note 39 supra.
119. 407 U.S. at 91.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
may be allowed in a particular situation, provided that a prompt
hearing be given the party whose property is seized. Secured credi-
tors as well as general creditors can seize property if these protective
features are present. Sniadach and Fuentes both recognized that in
extraordinary situations any creditor might summarily seize prop-
erty. The Di-Chem statutes failed for much the same reasons as
those in Sniadach and Fuentes; there was no official overseeing the
process. Consequently, no extraordinary situation was present. It
follows that if statutes allow creditors to summarily seize property
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the Fuentes rule
must apply; the statutes must provide for pre-seizure notice and
hearing. Since there was no such provision in the Georgia statutes,
they were unconstitutional. And there was no such provision present
in the statutes tested in Carey v. Sugar;2 ' they, too, were unconsti-
tutional for the same underlying reason as those in Di-Chem. 21
It seems clear that, if the Kay and Lubin analysis is correct, the
Court as a practical and theoretical matter has abandoned the dual
interests idea in favor of giving debtors somewhat more protection
than they had prior to Sniadach while assuring creditors access to
some property in the event of a favorable judgment. The Court, it
seems, has returned-in a modified sense-to a pre-Sniadach
stance. Has it, however, taken this posture by using the Fuentes
extraordinary situations exception as Kay and Lubin suggest? Catz
and Robinson doubt this is the case. While in the process of analyz-
ing Justice White's opinion in Mitchell, they turn to the problem of
categorizing Mitchell within the Fuentes extraordinary situation
exception:
Was Justice White [they ask] trying to say that this was somehow
an "extraordinary situation" requiring "special protection to a state
or creditor interest" as allows in Sniadach? Was he saying that this
was a case where the creditor "could make a showing of immediate
120. Kay & Lubin, supra note 39, at 716-22.
121. Kay and Lubin are correct in noting that Carey v. Sugar was concerned with the kind
of hearing that is to take place following seizure of property. The hearing must litigate the
plaintiff's underlying claim, not the interest in maintaining property as security in the event
of a favorable judgment. Of equal importance was the fact that Carey v. Sugar dealt a lethal
blow to the dual interest idea. See Kay & Lubin, supra note 39, at 718-22; see also notes
91-93 supra, and accompanying text.
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danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods?" It
would have been easy enough to attempt some such reconciliation of
the rationales of these opinions, but Justice White declined to do so. 122
Catz and Robinson mention only the first two of the three extraor-
dinary situations that would validate summary seizure, while it is
the third that Kay and Lubin claim Mitchell falls into. But the
point that Catz and Robinson are making is that nowhere in the
Mitchell opinion does Justice White even mention that the case falls
within any of the three extraordinary situations.
There are at least three reasons why the Court declined, from
Mitchell onward, to bring up extraordinary situations as the only
justification for bypassing pre-seizure notice and hearing. First, the
majority in Mitchell may have been convinced that all three of the
situations laid out by Justice Stewart must be present before pre-
seizure notice and hearing can be bypassed. A strong argument
could be made"' that all three would indeed have to be present. If
the Court in Mitchell felt that the Fuentes rule required the pres-
ence of all three before there was truly an extraordinary situation,
the facts of Mitchell simply forestalled any validation of the Louis-
iana statutes on the ground that they met the extraordinary situa-
tions exceptions to the pre-seizure notice and hearing require-
ment."'4
Second, even granting that any one of the extraordinary situa-
tions validates summary seizure there is a serious question concern-
ing the meaning of the third of the three, the one that Kay and
Lubin offer as the key to reconciling Sniadach and Fuentes with
Mitchell and Di-Chem. Kay and Lubin interpret Justice Stewart's
words, "the person initiating the seizure has been a government
official. . . ,"'I as meaning a judge issuing a writ of attachment or
122. Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 558 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).
123. See notes 38 & 39 supra, and accompanying text.
124. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in Mitchell, while arguing other points,
effectively destroyed any notion that the first two elements were present. See 416 U.S. at 629,
n.1. Thus, there could be no extraordinary situation validation of the statute. Of course the
third element of the three-fold extraordinary situations test remained unaddressed by Justice
Stewart. As the text discloses this really makes no difference. The presence of a judge empow-
ered to issue or deny issuing writs does not create an extraordinary situation; even if it does,
the Court appears indifferent to the proposition.
125. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91(1972); see note 121 supra, and accompanying text.
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garnishment in accordance with a narrowly drawn statute.2 ' Justice
Stewart himself, however, seems not to have had this meaning in
mind when he spoke on the point in Fuentes. When he gave the
three-fold test for extraordinary situations, he supported the test by
case examples. In each case governmental officials seized property
under writs issued by clerks, pursuant to statutes directing them to
do so. The governmental official made the determination, not the
clerk. True enough, this was not like a civilian creditor settling a
private score; the officials were protecting a vital public interest.
But had the situation been reversed, that is to say, if an ordinary
creditor was seeking a writ before a judge, under an appropriately,
narrowly drawn statute, would Justice Stewart have agreed that
this satisfies the third of his extraordinary situations? Possibly. But,
to repeat, the cases he cited were not of this latter variety. A govern-
mental official, the clerk, decided (and doubtless issued the writ,
having little discretion one way or the other) if the writ was to be
issued. The debtors were not at the mercy of a court functionary who
aids ordinary creditors in settling private scores. In point of fact, in
his Fuentes dissent Justice Stewart appears to feel that a judge,
rather than a clerk, issuing a writ is of little consequences.127
Finally, Justice White may have declined to classify Mitchell as
an extraordinary situation case because, setting out on the new path
described above, extraordinary situations escape routes will no
longer be needed. What, for example, could be more ordinary than
the Di-Chem fact situation?128 A general creditor garnished a
debtor's bank account. Yet the Court would have been satisfied if,
added to its already existing protective features such as the bond
requirement, the Georgia statutes had required that a judge deter-
126. Kay & Lubin, supra note 39, at 712-13.
127. See 416 U.S. at 632.
128. Di-Chem was, it is here suggested, an ordinary seizure situation; ordinary in that
both debtors and creditors are used to this kind of thing. And, as the text goes on to point
out, with additional protective procedures, the Georgia statutes would have passed constitu-
tional muster. But this does not mean that, even with additional protective procedures, every
sort of seizure would be tolerated. Kay and Lubin emphasize this point. They note, for
instance, "[t]he equal protection clause and whatever substantive elements remain of the
duQ process clause of the fourteenth amendment preclude takings which are arbitrary or
entirely unrelated to permissible objects of state regulation." Kay & Lubin, supra note 39,
at 717. Otherwise, the broadest possible grounds for seizure-i.e., seizing merely for the
creditor's security should the underlying suit be successful-would be constitutional.
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mine if the writ should issue (with no more reason than to insure
that property would be available to satisfy a judgment in the event
the plaintiff's suit succeeded) and that a hearing, at which the
plaintiff establishes the probable validity of the underlying claim,
be promptly held. Extraordinary situations seem to have disap-
peared altogether. Even so, Kay and Lubin have no doubt about the
true route the Court is taking: given proper procedural protection,
summary seizures of property is constitutional.'
Multistep analysis is abandoned. Now the Court appears disin-
clined to validate statutes only in the event they encompass truly
extraordinary situations, preferring instead a more relaxed view.
Nevertheless, the theorists agree that the Court has returned to the
more traditional stance in the field of pre-judgment creditor's reme-
dies.
C. Professor Scott and Cost Analysis
Professor Robert E. Scott, in a tightly reasoned, scholarly article
that should be required reading for all those interested in this par-
ticular aspect of debtor-creditor relations, argues that the Court's
"circular" route from Sniadach to Di-Chem is explainable on eco-
nomic theory grounds. 3 He examines this line of cases by way of
"cost analysis," of which he writes:
A cost analysis of legal procedure initially assumes that a fundamen-
tal goal of procedure is to produce an accurate resolution of disputes.
In the particular context of debtor default, due process, to the extent
that it requires additional procedures in ex parte situations, imposes
significant "direct" or litigation costs on the enforcement process.
These costs justify themselves in economic terms only if they contrib-
ute to at least a corresponding reduction in "error" costs-social costs
that arise when the legal system fails to perform accurately its as-
signed function of dispute resolution. The goal of allocative efficiency
is to minimize the sum of these costs."'
129. Kay & Lubin, supra note 39, at 717-18.
130. Scott, supra note 50.
131. Id. at 810, Professor Scott's article is, as the text points out, a long, tightly woven
piece. Consequently, it hardly lends itself to summations such as is undertaken here. The
attempt is certain to produce error and distortions. The article, therefore, should be read in
its entirety. It is hoped that what has been attempted here does not do an injustice to
Professor Scott's work.
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Professor Scott's thesis is that in Sniadach and Fuentes the Court
sought to redress what it perceived to be a constitutionally uncons-
cionable situation. That is, in the Court's opinion, debtors were
being deprived of their "expectation of just treatment because of a
systematic imbalance permitting creditor overreaching.'1 2 The way
to redress this imbalance was obvious to the majority in the two
cases: monitor the debtor-creditor bargaining process by requiring
an adversarial type hearing before the creditor can get at the dis-
puted property. By this means wrongful or erroneous takings can be
forestalled.
It is precisely at this point that cost analysis plays a crucial role
in the Sniadach line of cases. This new procedure obviously imposes
additional costs on the enforcement of creditor's claims. Costs,
however, are justifiable only if there is a corresponding reduction of
social error. The majority in Fuentes and Sniadach ignored the cost,
as it was compelled to do, having taken the position that market
forces created a "constitutionally unconscionable" situation that
could best be righted by imposing, indepeident of the bargaining
process, procedural limitations on the right of creditors to call on the
state for help in reaching a debtor's property. 13
The Mitchell and Di-Chem majority, Professor Scott shows, 134
were unwilling to continue the "constitutional unconscionability"
posture. They saw no reduction in error"5 costs that would off-set
the costs of the new procedural requirement. A prompt hearing
following seizure (a return to the pre-Sniadach method with the
Mitchell protective features added) would be just as effective, espe-
cially in light of the fact that debtors rarely take advantage of hear-
ing rights, irrespective of when the hearing may be held. Further-
more, the traditional method would provide the creditor with secu-
rity in the event of a favorable judgment. Thus, in the eyes of the
Mitchell/Di-Chem majority, nothing is gained by requiring a pre-
seizure hearing. A modified-traditional approach has at least some
cost benefits. This thought has been expressed another way:
132. Id. at 811.
133. See generally Scott, supra note 50, at 811-12, 814-24.
134. Id. at 835-64.
135. The term "error" is used to mean the mistaken taking of a debtor's property.
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[Wihile the Fuentes and Sniadach courts seem to regard the re-
quirements of notice and a prior hearing.as ends in themselves,
[Justice White] looks beyond the hearing to the ends it serves. To
Justice White, the only issue at such a hearing is the right to posses-
sion; if this issue can be resolved to a fair degree of certainty without
one, a hearing is not constitutionally required. 31
IV. SUMMING UP
Pre-seizure notice and hearing is a costly mechanism that has
shown no dividends. Perhaps it was destined for the legal junk heap.
Nevertheless, consumer advocates have little to wring their hands
over. Debtors received little from the Fuentes rule.137 Had the rule
remained, the costs would doubtless have been passed on to debtors
who took advantage of the hearing as well as to those who did not.
A variety of views has been presented; all seem to agree that the
Court's position on summary seizure is now more conventional. The
path it has trod has been circular. The guidelines that have emerged
during .this journey have been clarified. Statutes can be analyzed
with some degree of confidence as a result.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VIRGINIA DETINUE AND
ATTACHMENT STATUTES 1
In light of the above analysis it now seems clear that summary
seizure will be allowed if certain minimal requirements are met. The
136. Catz & Robinson, supra note 39, at 558. In short, Justice White sees the prompt post-
seizure hearing as a constitutionally acceptable substitute for the Fuentes rule.
137. Professor Scott points out that even the Fuentes majority recognized that most debt-
ors ignore hearings, pre- or post-seizure. Consequently, the Court backed away from extend-
ing the Sniadach compulsory hearing requirement to all seizure cases and held that an
opportunity to be heard would be sufficient. See Scott, supra note 50, at 823. Justice White
of course saw this point as crucial. See note 136 supra, and accompanying text.
138. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-114 through -123 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (detinue); VA. CODE ANN.
§ § 8.01-533 through -576 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (attachment). Virginia deeds of trust-specifically
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 1977)-are being tested, insofar as they relate to notice
prior to foreclosure. Scott v. Benn, 46 U.S.L.W. 3012 (July 12, 1977) (summarized) (no lower
court opinion) was filed in the United States Supreme Court, October term, 1977. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's opinion that the statute was constitutional.
But this and related statutes will not be examined in this article. Mechanics liens, trustee's
power to foreclose, landlord liens-these and similar statutes granting powers to seize prop-
erty without notice and a hearing are being challenged constantly. There is no reason to
believe that standards different from those applied to attachment and detinue will be applied
to these.
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list of requirements is not long and may dwindle further as the Court
continues to clarify its position. There is ground for belief that a
statutory scheme could even lack one or more requirements and still
meet the minimum standards of due process. Until such a statute
is tested, however, it seems fair to assume that the absence of any
of these requirements will be fatal.
One thing is certain, any statutory scheme that follows Mitchell
will survive. The same may be said for the New York statutes in
Carey v. Sugar, which met the Mitchell standards as modified by
Di-Chem. The Carey statutes, being less stringent than those of
Mitchell, mark, as of today, the bottom line of basic due process.
In addition, according to Di-Chem, statutes may give summary
seizure power to unsecured creditors as well as secured creditors.
Summary seizure provisions, then, will pass constitutional muster
if they meet the following:
1. the grounds upon which a writ will issue must not be capricious
or arbitrary;
2. a judge must be the official charged with issuing the writ;
3. the plaintiff must, prior to the writ's being issued, post bonds
that will indemnify the defendant in the event plaintiff loses the
underlying cause of action; and
4. the defendant must have the opportunity to have a prompt post-
seizure hearing at which the validity of the plaintiff's underlying
cause of action will be litigated.
Virginia's attachment statute contains some but not all these
features. Its validity is thus questionable. The detinue provision, on
the other hand, should be able to withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge.
A. Detinue
Accompanying the new section 8.01-11411 (the first section in the
detinue Article) is the following Reviser's Note:
139. Detinue in Virginia is similar to the provisional remedies in other states called re-
plevin or claim and delivery. Plaintiffs with a particular interest, a pre-existing interest in
specific property, use this means of summarily getting the property. See BURKS, COMMON LAW
AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, §§ 125, 126 (4th ed. 1952). See also note 5 supra.
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This section [the old section 8-586] and others in this article were
amended in 1974 to make the procedure comply with the require-
ments set out in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). These two cases
were further discussed in a later case of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 416
U.S. 600 (1974) in which the Supreme Court restricted the scope of
the two former cases. [The old section 8-586] meets the criteria of
constitutionality set out in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant. Therefore no
substantive changes have been made. "'
Careful examination of the various sections-8.01-114 through 8.01-
130-forces agreement that changes were unnecessary.
Under the detinue provisions, property may be seized only upon
grounds similar to those required in allegations in Louisiana and
New York. When it is recalled that the Court in Carey v. Sugar gave
its approval to the summary seizure of property in order that a
creditor, secured or unsecured, could simply have property available
as security in the event the main suit is successful, the grounds in
section 8.01-114 are shown to be relatively restrictive. Furthermore,
the required allegations appear to be the kind subject to documen-
tary proof, at least insofar as was the case in Mitchell. It should be
borne in mind that this later point faded away almost entirely in
Di-Chem and Carey v. Sugar.'
Section 8.01-114A specifies that only a judge (or magistrate) may
order the seizure of property, and paragraphs B and C indicate that
he is given more latitude deciding if the property should be seized
than was the judge under the Louisiana statutes in Mitchell. The
defendant is not, at this ex parte point in the proceedings, at the
mercy of a mere functionary who issues orders on conclusory plead-
ings.
A bond, according to section 8.01-115, at double the value of the
property the plaintiff wants to seize, must be executed by the'plain-
tiff before a seizure order can be issued. Costs and damages, in the
event the plaintiff does not prevail in the main suit, will be awarded
140. VIRGINIA CODE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GovERNoR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA ON RsSION OF TrrLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 14, at 108 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
141. See note 93 supra, and accompanying text.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:157
the defendant. This would seem to cover similar provisions in the
Louisiana statutes relied on by the Court in Mitchell. 42
Section 8.01-119, which provides for a preliminary hearing, carries
with it this Reviser's Note:
[This is old section 8-591.] The word "court" has been substituted
for the word "judge." The 1973 Session of the Legislature altered this
section in order to conform with the Supreme Court decisions pre-
viously mentioned in the Reviser's Note to § 8.01-114. The Revisers
have concluded that the 1973 substantive changes conform with the
present constitutional requirements of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 416
U.S. 600 (1974).' 43
Again the reviser is entirely correct. There is a right to a prompt
hearing-twenty-one days or earlier upon motion. Furthermore, this
section goes beyond Fuentes and falls more within Sniadach since
the defendant is guaranteed a hearing; Fuentes required only an
opportunity to be heard. The probable validity of the plaintiff's
cause of action can be litigated and the burden is on the plaintiff
to show the substantial likelihood that he will prevail in his cause
of action.' I
142. See 416 U.S. at 616-17, wherein it is noted that in the event it is determined that the
sequestration order was wrongfully issued, the defendant will be awarded damages. The same
provision does not appear in the Virginia section on detinue. Clearly, though, the bonding
provisions of section 8.01-115 reach the same end at whatever point in the process the seizure
is dissolved or the defendant prevails in the main suit. 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 349, n.102 (1975).
(The suggestion is made therein that this provision could be fatal to the Virginia statute).
Section 8.01-116 provides that by posting bond, the defendant may get his property returned.
A like provision was in the Louisiana statutes. Such a provision apparently was unimportant
to the Court in its later decisions. This is understandable; few debtor defendants can afford
to post such bonds (though it was done in Di-Chem, which underscores the fact that such
bonding provisions are widespread). More significantly, few debtors, even if they could afford
to post bonds to get their property back, would actually do so if they are going to get a prompt
hearing (no hearing was available to the debtor in Di-Chem). If they prevail at the hearing,
they get the property returned without posting bond. If they lose, they could, of course, post
bond then; but, are they really like to do so in that event? Probably not. If defendants lost
at the preliminary hearing, odds are great that they will lose at the main trial. That being
the case, why post bond? The property is going to be taken anyway. Di-Chem established
that the presence of this provision will not save a weak statutory scheme. Its absence, if there
is along with other standards a provision for a prompt post-seizure hearing, ought to do little
harm. Be that as it may, Virginia has the provision in its detinue sections.
143. CoMMissioN REPORT, supra note 140, at 110.
144. Paragraph B of section 8.01-119 does not use the words "probable validity;" it says
that "if it ... appears . . . that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff's allega-
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The detinue statutes, then, are constitutionally sound. They meet
the four requirements, but the same may not be said for the attach-
ment statutes.
B. Attachment '45
Unlike the detinue sections, nowhere in the attachment sec-
tions-8.01-533 through 8.01-576-can a reviser's statement be
found that says that the statutes conform to the guidelines that
emerged from the Sniadach line of cases.'46 This absence is under-
standable. The sections do not meet any of the constitutional re-
quirements squarely.
The grounds which must be alleged before an attachment writ
will issue are found in section 8.01-534. Subsection I of this section
appears to be clearly unconstitutional. The recent case of Shaffer
v. Heitner'17 seems to have struck down all such quasi in rem provi-
sions. Assuming that the section will otherwise be unaffected by this
decision, the other grounds are those typically found in other juris-
dictions, fraudulent, quasi-criminal activity being the sole grounds
justifying the drastic action of attachment. These grounds are not
unlike those found in Carey v. Sugar. They are the kind of allega-
tions, therefore, that seem to require adversarial determination. But
Carey v. Sugar did not recognize this as a problem.
An attachment is commenced, as directed by section 8.01-537A,
by filing a petition with the clerk of the court. The petition must
state the cause of action "with such certainty as will give the ad-
verse party reasonable notice of the particulars thereof ....
tions will be sustained . . ." then the seizure will stand (emphasis added). The Court in
Carey v. Sugar was satisfied with not litigating the issue because "the plaintiff must ulti-
mately fail." 425 U.S. at 78. This shifts the burden to the defendant! This was a matter once
thought crucial; the Mitchell Court and the district court in Carey v. Sugar saw it as vital.
The burden problem, thus, appears to have disappeared now that Carey v. Sugar has been
decided.
In sum, litigating the substantial likelihood of the plaintiff's prevailing on his cause of
action should satisfy this factor of due process, especially since the Court seems to care little
where the burden of proof is placed at the preliminary hearing. And, in Virginia, it is on the
plaintiff.
145. See note 5 supra.
146. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-533 through -576 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
147. 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
148. VA. CoDE AN. § 8.01-537A (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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Such fact pleading was present in Mitchell and insisted on by the
Court. Its absence was one of the fatal weaknesses in the Di-Chem
statutes, but conclusory pleadings were ignored altogether by the
Court in Carey v. Sugar. The presence of fact pleading, therefore,
is laudatory, but is its absence fatal? If it is, the attachment statutes
may be unconstitutional, for this section requires only that the peti-
tion "set forth the existence of one or more of the grounds of attach-
ment . . . ,,. " Merely copying one of the grounds (not the first, of
course) would satisfy this requirement. The cause of action must be
factually plead but not the grounds. But, again, is this fatal? More
of this later. First, a look at the problem created by the power of a
clerk to issue a writ of attachment.
The three-judge court in Carey v. Sugar found the New York
statutes unconstitutional, but, as was seen earlier, 50 that court
found that, in some areas, the statutes compared favorably with
those in Mitchell. One of these was that a judge decided if a writ,
based on plaintiff's affidavit, should issue. Section 8.01-537 says
that a clerk, based on plaintiff's affidavit, shall issue the writ. Is this
fatal? Is the presence of a judge essential at the ex parte stage?
Justice White, in his Di-Chem opinion, placed considerable stress
on this point, but as Justice Powell in his concurring opinion ob-
served, 51 the majority fell considerably short of making such a pres-
ence an absolute. 52 In Carey v. Sugar the New York requirement
that a judge issue the writ was silently passed over in the Court's
per curiam decision.
It can be argued, as Professor Scott has done,15 1 that the participa-
tion of a judge at the ex parte level is of little importance. Factual
pleading with respect to the underlying cause of action is required
by the statute in Virginia, and even were a judge prepared to em-
bark on a wide-ranging, factfinding mission, little, Professor Scott's
persuasive argument goes, would be gained; the facts are peculiarly
within the creditor's knowledge. Usually, all that will be alleged is
149. Id.
150. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
151. 419 U.S. at 611.
152. Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, makes much the same observation. 419
U.S. at 619.
153. Scott, supra note 50, at 853-55.
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the indebtedness and a failure to pay. Both allegations, obviously,
are open to documentary, factual showings. If a creditor, wishing
perhaps to settle a score or engage in a frivolous adventure, is willing
to lie in his affidavit, he is as likely to do it with a judge as with a
clerk. The penalties are the same. The avoidance of error in seizing
property is thus the same whether a clerk or judge gets a "factual"
statement that has been sworn to.
154
Grounds for attachment in section 8.01-537 may be established by
conclusory allegations, the lack of factual support being a weakness,
like the absence of a judge, Justice White found in the Georgia
statutes tested in Di-Chem. However, the same argument given
above applies here. If factual pleading were required, what would
be gained? A fraudulent conveyance, for example, would be difficult
to establish factually and, besides, what facts there are are those
again peculiarly within the plaintiff's knowledge. Without adver-
sarial input can fraudulent intent be established? It is doubtful.
Conclusory pleadings would, therefore, as Professor Scott demon-
strates, 55 serve the purpose. What is more, the grounds required to
be alleged under section 8.01-537 are similar to those in New York.
They, too, called for adversarial input, but the Court found them
satisfactory. True enough, a judge issued the writ, but on conclusory
allegations. '5
Whether the grounds may be established by conclusory or factual
allegations seems today to be of little importance. Di-Chem and
Carey allowed seizure so that the creditor could be secure in the
event of a favorable judgment.'57 That is an interest worthy of pro-
tection; an interest on the same footing as a secured creditor's inter-
est. The grounds for attachment, in short, are immaterial, so long
as the statute is not arbitrary or capricious.158 Thus it would seem
to make no difference if grounds must be alleged to make the allega-
tion conclusory rather than factual. Furthermore, a judge is no more
capable than a clerk in issuing writs under these circumstances.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 6212(E) (McKinney 1963).
157. Di.Chem statutes were struck down, but not because the creditor's interest in seeing
that the bank account was frozen was not worthy of protection. This is an interest worthy of
protection, as became clearer in Carey v. Sugar.
158. See note 128 supra, and accompanying text.
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It is, in the final analysis, the right to a prompt post-seizure
hearing that is critical. It is at that point that there will be adver-
sarial input. If it is established that there is a debt and default, then
the property can justifiably be kept in custody so that, if ultimately
successful, the plaintiff can have guaranteed access to assets. The
prompt post-seizure hearing is a sufficient substitute for pre-seizure
notice and hearing.' s Thus, if provisional remedy statutes are not
arbitrary or capricious and, if they provide a prompt post-seizure
hearing (which Virginia does in section 8.01-568) then for those
reasons alone, remedies are very nearly within the constitutional
guidelines.
Under section 8.01-568, the defendant may at any time before or
following seizure move to have the writ quashed. At the hearing on
the motion, the plaintiff's underlying claim may be litigated. If this
issue is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of proving he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his underlying claim. This squares exactly
with the Court's requirement in Carey. Virginia's attachment stat-
utes appear, therefore, to very nearly meet minimal due process
standards. There remains, though, the bond problems.
Under section 8.01-551, bond is not required before an attachment
writ is issued. It is required if the defendant's property is to be
seized. Thus, the defendant will not be deprived of the use of prop-
erty until a bond is posted. The bond must be for an amount double
the value of the property seized. Equally important is the provision
that the plaintiff is liable for damages suffered by the defendant (or
anyone else) by reason of the plaintiff's suing out the attachment.
Except for the technicality of being able to get a writ before posting
bond, this section is like the Louisiana statute in Mitchell.
The bond requirement, like the problem of the judge at the ex
parte proceeding and the problem of conclusory allegations, appears
to be of no or at best secondary importance. If a pre-seizure hearing
is required, of what use would a bond be? If the plaintiff prevails at
the hearing, he may afterwards have to post bond. But at that stage,
is the defendant going to care one way or the other? Conclusory
allegation? What difference does it make if the property is not seized
until after a hearing and only then if the plaintiff prevails? It is the
159. See note 136 supra, and accompanying text.
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pre-seizure hearing, an adversary type hearing, that will determine
facts and conclusions.
It follows therefore that if a prompt post-seizure hearing is an
adequate substitute for the Fuentes rule, then bonds, judges and
conclusory allegations, are relatively unimportant considerations if
a prompt post-seizure is in fact provided by statute. Virginia, in its
detinue and attachment statutes, has such a provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Virginia detinue statutes provide the required basic due pro-
cess. The attachment statutes have areas that arouse suspicion
about their constitutionality, but they appear capable of withstand-
ing a challenge by a latter day Sniadach or Fuentes. After all, the
Supreme Court has come full circle.
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